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Abstract 
This article adopts feminist methodology to demonstrate how women’s rights and reproductive 
freedom can be enhanced at the judicial level: a process that can lead to legal reform. The 
practice of feminist judgment-writing is central in achieving this objective. Recently, feminist 
scholars and practitioners have come together to rewrite landmark judgments concerning 
women’s rights. Examples of these efforts can be found in the Women’s Court of Canada and 
the UK Feminist Judgments Project. Drawing from these reformative experiences, the article 
rewrites two abortion judgments of the European Court of Human Rights: A, B and C v Ireland 
and P and S v Poland. These revisions emphasise the necessity for alternate accounts of 
women’s rights in the courtroom. 
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Introduction 
 
In this article, I engage in a feminist rewriting of two decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights on reproductive rights – A, B and C v Ireland1 and P and S v Poland.2 In doing so, I 
draw on concepts from feminist jurisprudence – such as women’s agency, reproductive 
autonomy and intersectionality –  to contest the dominant, masculine paradigm that has shaped 
* Vanessa Sauls Avolio, Law graduate from Queen Mary University of London. London, United Kingdom.  
Email: vanessa.sauls@live.it. I would like to thank Rosemary Hunter, Professor of Law and Socio-Legal Studies at 
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original research project. 
1 ECHR (GC) 25579/05; [2010] ECHR 2032.  
2 ECHR 57375/08; [2012] ECHR 1853. 
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the court’s traditional legal reasoning. Feminist legal theory has revealed the masculine bias in 
law-making, law enforcement and judicial decision-making. While I agree with these feminist 
critiques of law, I assert that feminist practical reasoning3 can be effective in reconciling legal 
methods with women’s experiences. The emergence of feminist judgment-writing 
demonstrates that it is possible to formulate a legal sphere in which women’s perspectives are 
implemented. Thus, I suggest that law can be used as both a ‘site’ and a ‘tool’ for feminist 
struggle4 – but only if feminism can become the site and tool of legal method. 
 
Thus, the aim of this article is to channel feminist legal theory into practice, and to provide 
feminist interpretations of facts and concepts to secure tangible legal results for women. In 
doing so, I am inspired by Eva Brems’ edited collection Diversity and European Human 
Rights: Rewriting Judgments of the ECHR,5 the efforts of the Women’s Court of Canada 
(WCC)6 and the UK Feminist Judgments Project (FJP).7 These works represent a “feminist 
intervention in law”:8 they debunk existing patterns of social and legal reasoning, whilst 
introducing feminist perspectives to the legal issues concerned. They demonstrate how to 
‘feminise’ legal rules not only in theory but also in practice, in order to bring tangible change 
to women’s experiences as citizens under the law.9 
 
 
  
3 K. T. Bartlett, ‘Feminist Legal Methods’ (1990) Harvard Law Review 103(4), p. 829. 
4 C. Smart, ‘The Woman of Legal Discourse’, in Law, Crime and Sexuality: Essays in Feminism (Sage, 1995), p. 187.  
5 E. Brems (ed.) Diversity and European Human Rights: Rewriting Judgments of the ECHR (Cambridge University 
Press, 2012). 
6 D. Majury, ‘Introducing the Women’s Court of Canada’ (2008) Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 18(1), 
pp. 1–12. 
7 See the Feminist Judgments Project’s website: http://www.feministjudgments.org.uk [accessed on 26 
December 2016]. 
8 R. Hunter, ‘The Power of Feminist Judgments?’ (2012) Feminist Legal Studies 20(2), p. 137. 
9 An insight into the bias of legal rules, judicial frameworks and human rights is given by Siobhán Mullally and 
Claire Murray, ‘Regulating Abortion: Dissensus and the Politics of Rights’ (2016) Social & Legal Studies 25(6), pp. 
645–650. Mullally and Murray correctly emphasise that the concept of human rights cannot per se protect or 
enhance women’s reproductive autonomy; in fact, the recognition of the sanctity of life as a human right has 
been manipulated to hinder women’s access to abortion in countries like Ireland, Poland and Malta. Similarly, 
in countries where women can request abortions, physicians and doctors are the primary decision-makers with 
the ability to concede or deny women’s choices. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2 
 
                                                          
feminists@law  Vol 6, No 2 (2017) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
The scope and utility of feminist judgment-writing 
 
Feminist judgment-writing can be understood as a collective project, shared between feminist 
activists, legal scholars and practitioners, whose objective is to revolutionise legal reasoning. 
By integrating an understanding of women’s lives in their environmental and societal contexts 
into judicial reasoning, feminist judges reject many of the claims made about the world by 
mainstream judges. For example, in Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice,10 twenty-
nine judgment-writers endeavoured to integrate feminist analyses into judicial assessments of 
facts and interpretations of law in high profile English cases; they demonstrated that it is 
possible for feminists to engage with the law whilst showing awareness of how law has 
traditionally worked to restrict women’s access to justice. 
 
A striking illustration of the feminist approach to judging is Clare McGlynn’s rewriting of R v 
A (No 2).11 In the original judgment, the issue before the House of Lords was whether alleged 
prior sexual encounters of a rape complainant with the defendant could be admissible to 
determine the issue of consent. In her straightforward evaluation, McGlynn goes a long way to 
protect A, the victim of rape, from further victimisation before the House. She criticises the 
social and legal distrust of rape complainants, fuelled by myths about women’s lack of 
credibility as witnesses, especially when they are deemed to be ‘promiscuous’. McGlynn also 
emphasises the chilling effects that questioning about sexual history in court has on rape 
reporting in general.12 Irrelevant sexual history evidence is likely to mislead the jury and stand 
in the way of accurate fact-finding. She makes a case that questioning a rape complainant in 
court about her sexual history may constitute inhuman or degrading treatment in violation of 
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In her view, accepting 
evidence about previous sexual relations with either third parties or the defendant as tending to 
suggest consent would contravene the (liberal) ideas of women’s sexual agency and freedom 
to give or withhold consent in each individual instance. Such reasoning operates systematically 
to the detriment of women who are the main recipients of sexual abuse. 
 
10 R. Hunter, C. McGlynn and E. Rackley (eds), Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice (Hart Publishing, 
2010). 
11 [2001] UKHL 25 
12 C. McGlynn, ‘R v A (No 2)’, in Hunter, McGlynn and Rackley (eds.), op. cit. n.10, p.212. 
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Women’s sexuality is a large component of their positioning in the eyes of the law. Women’s 
biology and reproductivity is often used to make assumptions about their temperament and 
disposition and, thus, to draw conclusions about their credibility as parties. However, in other 
cases, the gendered effects of law and the cultural and social specificity of women’s position 
are merely glossed over in judicial reasoning.13 These arbitrary methods of considering gender 
issues under the law are rectified in feminist judging: women’s sexuality is neither omnipresent 
nor inexistent and gender issues are given appropriate weight when assessing the facts before 
the court.  
 
The characterisation of women as primarily reproductive beings interferes in particular with 
the vindication of their rights. Women’s reproductive rights claims, for example, are often met 
with ethical objections that characterise the foetus as a child. As a child, the foetus is seen as 
deserving the care of a mother who has a moral duty to carry her pregnancy to term in its best 
interest. In the context of abortion, the debate has been dominated by anti-abortionists’ 
formulation of the foetus as a person in its own right. I argue that this is incoherent with the 
threshold of personhood set by liberal definitions of the legal person. It is incompatible with 
the prerequisites of the legal person as autonomous, self-possessed and self-contained; yet, I 
contend that the exemption of the foetus from these requirements is congruent with the power 
hierarchies in the biological family, and the “sexual repressions necessary to maintain it”.14  
Once a woman is pregnant, the state ‘claims’ her foetus by attributing personal rights to it; this 
way, the woman’s personhood is taken out of the picture and her main purpose becomes that 
of upholding the rights of the new ‘person’. By treating the foetus as a person, the state demotes 
the woman’s status and contributes to defining her role as a mother whose primary duty is to 
protect her child. 
 
 
  
13 See, for example, the case of Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No 2) [2001] UKHL 44, in which assumptions 
were made about the role of women in marital relationships, including the idea that a wife’s economic interest 
is aligned with that of her husband. The actions of solicitors in failing to alert Mrs Etridge about the burdensome 
transaction, and of the bank in failing to confirm that she had consented to it freely, were justified or ignored. 
14 S. Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex (Morrow, 1970), p. 65. 
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Different feminist methods and approaches to feminist judging 
 
The methods used by feminists to disrupt mainstream judicial approaches differ. Feminist 
judgments come in diverse formats, from whole rewritings to the partial editing of judgments.15 
The benefit of rewriting entire judgments is that feminist judges attain freedom in structuring 
their judgment, not having to follow established structures in adjudication. Similarly, they gain 
control over the substance of the judgment, how the issues are addressed and the weight placed 
on each claim before the court. This method is the most subversive strategy, in that it 
counterposes feminist and mainstream judging, while proposing the former as a viable 
alternative to the latter. 
 
The difference between rewriting and redrafting judgments is one of scope and viability. The 
structural freedom of the rewritings presented in the FJP, the WCC or the more recent 
Northern/Irish Feminist Judgments Project,16 is congruent with the common-law tradition, 
where judges use their status to legitimise changes in the law or the introduction of new laws. 
In common law systems, case law is of primary importance and judges use it to evolve the law 
in different directions, often catering for social and political change. For example, the 
jurisprudential debate over legal fictions – which can be “exploratory” when the courts attempt 
to introduce or modify rules – demonstrates that the common law accepts departures from 
established legal forms and doctrines.17 Feminist rewritings do not necessarily rely on legal 
fictions to implement women’s rights and embed feminist theory into the common law; 
however, the existence of fictions in the common law justifies using feminist contentions as a 
15 For example, the Women’s Court of Canada and the UK and Northern/Irish Feminist Judgment Projects have 
engaged in whole rewritings of judgments: see (2006) 18(1) Canadian Journal of Women and the Law; Hunter, 
McGlynn and Rackley, op. cit. n.10; M. Enright, J. McCandless and Aoife O’Donoghue (eds), Northern/Irish 
Feminist Judgments: Judges’ Troubles and the Gendered Politics of Identity (Hart Publishing, 2017). By 
comparison, Eva Brems’ edited collection uses a more surgical approach, by modifying existing case law to 
promote a feminist interpretation of human rights and integrate diversity into legal discourse: op. cit. n. 5. 
16 Enright, McCandless and O’Donghue, ibid. 
17 For example, see Ronald Dworkin’s account of judicial decision-making in ‘Hard Cases’ (1975) Harvard Law 
Review 88(6), p.1057, where he describes how judges have responsibility for weighing conflicting legal principles 
against each other, often to the detriment of strict legal rules. He gives two example of cases, namely Riggs v 
Palmer and Henningsen v Bloomfield Motors Inc., to demonstrate that the early positivist and Hartian accounts 
of legal rules omit an important aspect of the legal process: not creativity per se, but rational inductive reasoning. 
I argue that legal fictions help judges make a leap in their decision-making where it is not possible to reach a just 
conclusion in the face of black letter law or established legal customs. 
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tool to enhance judicial reasoning: in this context, rewriting judgments and appropriating legal 
forms and personas becomes a feasible means to attain gender justice. 
 
Civil law systems are not as malleable as the common law. Codified statutes are the driving 
force in judicial decision-making and judgments rely heavily on existing ordinances. For 
example, the European Court of Human Rights uses its case law to interpret the European 
Convention on Human Rights as a living instrument.18 While the Court’s case law acts as 
precedent for judicial reasoning, it is apparent that decisions under the ECHR follow a more 
rigid format than common law judgments: they are more predictable and leave little scope for 
judicial creativity. For this reason, redrafting the Court’s judgments has been a more effective 
way for me to demonstrate to the original judges that they could have reached different 
conclusions without violating the established formats of their judgments. 
 
While rewriting common law cases from a feminist standpoint is effective to establish 
completely different yet plausible decisions, the redrafting approach is more suitable for 
revising European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) cases. In her edited collection Diversity 
and European Human Rights: Rewriting Judgments of the ECHR, Eva Brems explains the 
redrafting strategy not as one strictly focused on changing the outcome of decisions, but one 
that improves the original court’s reasoning.  She also mentions the pragmatic value of 
judgments that could have been written realistically by the ECtHR. Brems’ focus on the 
viability of feminist redrafts is important; whichever approach we choose, if feminist judges 
aim to make a difference in the law, the context in which our judging takes place is paramount. 
For common law cases, rewritings are effective and credible in a way that would not apply to 
cases from the ECtHR. 
 
 
The benefit of feminist judgment-writing: formal vs. substantive equality 
 
Despite the varying feminist approaches to judging, the practice of writing feminist judgments 
has common, identifiable objectives. Firstly, it aims to implement the concept of substantive – 
as opposed to formal – equality before the law. Formal equality assumes that we can attain 
18 European Court of Human Rights, ‘The Court in brief’. Available at: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Court_in_brief_ENG.pdf [accessed on 25 February 2017].  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6 
 
                                                          
feminists@law  Vol 6, No 2 (2017) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
justice by treating women equally to men under all circumstances, thereby ignoring women’s 
gendered experiences. By contrast, substantive equality aims to produce equitable outcomes 
for women and men, while recognising that they are subject to different circumstances in life. 
A tangible defect in the notion of formal equality is the limited importance given to women’s 
reproductive autonomy.19 Secondly, feminist judgments strive to change legal doctrine by 
incorporating women’s experiences into judicial thinking. Thirdly, they defy essentialism by 
considering women’s diverse experiences as legal persons and interpreting rights considering 
specific circumstances. For example, in the context of reproductive rights, abortion restrictions 
are discriminatory against women on various grounds in addition to sex. As well as constituting 
a form of sexual oppression, abortion restrictions create differential social and economic 
burdens for women. Thus, abortion access must be understood as an intersectional issue.20 To 
fully comprehend reproductive rights and abortion claims, it is necessary to expand women’s 
legal personality beyond sexuality and biology. Unfortunately, domestic and international 
courts have not addressed reproductive rights claims with this holistic approach.  
 
Finally, feminist judges are open to providing alternative accounts of facts. This becomes 
possible through contextualisation and the realisation that, just like law, facts cannot be 
considered in a vacuum. For instance, in YL v Birmingham City Council21 the House of Lords 
decided by a majority of 3 to 2 that a private care home providing services on behalf of the 
local authority to an elderly lady with Alzheimer’s disease was not exercising “functions of a 
public nature” under section 6(3)(b) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA).  Thus, it could not 
be subject to a claim under the HRA that her ECHR rights had been breached. By contrast, the 
feminist judgment by Caroline Hunter and Helen Carr reached the opposite conclusion through 
an alternative account of the facts of the case.22 Their reasoning positioned YL at the centre of 
19 See also, for example, Evans v Amicus Healthcare Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 727 in which Evans’ appeal against a 
decision that she was not entitled to utilize IVF frozen embryos after her partner had withdrawn consent was 
dismissed. Evans also lost her appeal at the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (Evans v 
United Kingdom, ECHR 6339/05). Both the domestic and European judgments ignored the different meaning of 
the embryos for Evans and her male partner, and their differential ability to use the embryos in any event. The 
original judgment is an example of how judicial reasoning resorts to formal equality, which neutralises sexual 
differences and discriminates against women like Evans in gender-specific situations such as pregnancy.  
20 See K. Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics’ (1989) University of Chicago Legal Forum, 
p. 139.  
21 [2007] UKHL 27. 
22 C. Hunter and H. Carr, ‘YL v Birmingham City Council’, in Hunter, McGlynn and Rackley, op. cit. n.10, pp.205-
227. 
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the case as an elderly, disabled woman in need of a home and medical care, the provision of 
which were functions of a public nature. Their judgment shifted focus from the contractual 
relationship between the private care home and Birmingham City Council towards YL as a 
person and the imperative of protecting her dignity and human rights. 
 
In this article I apply the method of feminist judging to the issue of women’s reproductivity, a 
key area in which traditional judging has denied women their autonomy based on sex and 
gender, focusing on the landmark case of A, B and C v Ireland and the recent judgment of P 
and S v Poland.23 In the next section I explain the factual background and reasoning of the 
ECtHR in each case, and suggest what the Court should have concluded differently by 
reference to feminist perspectives. In the following section I offer practical feminist rewritings 
of those judgments. Contrary to a recent conclusion that abortion violates the ECHR,24 I 
demonstrate that, by introducing feminist contentions in human rights adjudication, abortion 
can be interpreted compatibly with the rights enshrined in the ECHR. I avail myself of the same 
evidence and materials available to the Court at the time of the judgments. 
 
 
The ECtHR’s procedural abortion rights jurisprudence 
 
A, B and C v Ireland25 
 
The applicants in this case believed that they were not entitled to abortion access in Ireland. 
Each of them was unsure whether travelling abroad for an abortion was legal under Irish law. 
The first applicant travelled to England on 28 February 2005. She had been involuntarily 
pregnant for nine and a half weeks. In addition, she was living in poverty and did not have the 
financial means to support her four children; in fact, her children were in foster care. A was a 
recovering alcoholic who was battling depression; hence, “a further child […] would [have 
jeopardised] her health and the successful reunification of her family”.26 In order to obtain an 
abortion, A was forced to borrow money. She did not inform anyone about her decision to 
23 [2010] ECHR 2032; [2012] ECHR 1853. 
24 G. Puppinck, ‘Abortion and the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2013) Irish Journal of Legal Studies 
3(2), p.142. 
25 [2010] ECHR 2032. 
26Ibid., para. 14. 
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travel to England, including the social workers. Upon her return to Ireland she refrained from 
seeking post-abortion treatment. The second applicant was seven weeks pregnant when she 
travelled to England. She had become pregnant despite her use of emergency contraception. 
Like the first applicant, B had difficulty meeting the expenses of travelling abroad for an 
abortion. She was also afraid that doing so would have legal repercussions. When she sought 
follow-up care upon her return, she was referred to a Dublin clinic affiliated to the one that had 
performed the treatment in England. The third applicant had become involuntarily pregnant 
when her cancer went into remission but, unaware of the pregnancy, she had undergone a series 
of further tests for cancer. Fearing that these would impact on the foetus, and that the pregnancy 
would aggravate her condition, she sought an abortion in England. Upon her return, she 
suffered complications, including bleeding and infection. 
 
The first and second applicants’ complaints were grounded on the restrictiveness of Ireland’s 
abortion law. Abortion was criminalised in Ireland under the Offences against the Person Act 
1861, which made it unlawful to procure or attempt to procure a miscarriage.27 In 1983, the 
Eighth Amendment to the Irish Constitution introduced a ban on abortion which recognised 
the speculative right to life of the unborn.28  Article 40.3.3° provides: “The State acknowledges 
the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, 
guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate 
that right”. As a result, an abortion jurisprudence developed against women’s reproductive 
autonomy, diminishing their subjectivity and agency.29 
 
Additional changes were made to the abortion regime when the case of a 14-year-old abortion-
seeking girl caused public indignation. She (‘X’) had been the victim of rape and, thus, sought 
to obtain an abortion; however, the public authorities secured an injunction to prevent her from 
travelling abroad to have the pregnancy terminated. In Attorney General v X,30 the injunction 
27 Offences against the Person Act 1861, ss. 58 (as amended) and 59. 
28 Constitution of Ireland, Article 40.3.3°.  
29 See, for example, A and B v Eastern Health Board & C [1997] IEHC 176, in which a 13-year-old girl who had 
become pregnant as a result of rape was forced to undergo an abortion rather than being allowed to make a 
choice independently. In Baby O (Suing by Mother and Next Friend IAO) v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform [2002] IESC 53, a pregnant Nigerian refugee was allowed to be deported notwithstanding the risks that 
this would pose to the unborn foetus; here, protecting the life of the unborn did not suffice to interfere with the 
deportation order. 
30 [1992] IESC 1; [1992] 1 IR 1. 
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was overturned by the Supreme Court when it held that it is a woman’s right to obtain an 
abortion where there is “a real and substantive risk” to her life. In that case, X had become 
suicidal as a consequence of being denied access to abortion. Following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in the X case, a referendum brought the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments into 
being, which allow women to travel abroad for abortion and receive information relating to 
abortion services.  
 
In her feminist rewriting of Attorney General v X,31  Ruth Fletcher demonstrates a 
responsiveness to the human and constitutional rights of women above and beyond the 
limitations imposed by Article 40.3.3°. She reinforces the notion that law should be interpreted 
and applied for its intended beneficiaries, which include women,32 and maintains that, as 
judges, we should “imagine ourselves in the position of the litigant”.33 This approach allows 
us to view adjudication not as a vehicle for obedience, but rather for empathy in the face of 
diversity.34 The power of Fletcher’s re-imagination of the X case lies in her analysis of the Irish 
constitutional framework, whereby X’s rights to bodily integrity, equal treatment and liberty 
must be observed when interpreting Article 40.3.3°. She holds on to the doctrine of harmonious 
interpretation to suggest that Article 40.3.3° cannot extinguish women’s existing constitutional 
rights. Fletcher’s approach to narrowing the purpose of Article 40.3.3°, mapping out women’s 
constitutional rights and dissecting the right to life of the unborn is relevant to my rewriting of 
A, B and C v Ireland. Assessing the entirety of women’s human and constitutional rights, our 
rewritings are unconstrained by literal interpretations of the law; they work expansively and 
articulate judicial conscience on the basis of women’s civil and political rights. 
 
In, A, B and C, the applicants argued that Ireland’s framework on abortion violated Articles 3, 
8 and 14 of the ECHR.  The third applicant also complained that the restrictions had placed her 
life at risk, in violation of Article 2. Under the ECHR, Article 2 establishes the right to life, 
save in the execution of a sentence where death is prescribed by law; Article 3 protects 
individuals from inhuman or degrading treatment. Article 8 safeguards their private and family 
life. Unlike Articles 2 and 3, which are absolute, the right to private and family life can be 
31 R. Fletcher, ‘Attorney-General v X’, in Enright, McCandless and O’Donoghue, op. cit. n.15, p.379.  
32 Ibid., p.380. 
33 Ibid., p.381. 
34 Ibid. 
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limited.35 Article 14 prohibits discrimination on any ground in the enjoyment of Convention 
rights, but can only be triggered when another right is engaged. 
 
In relation to Article 2 the Court dismissed C’s complaint. It rejected it as ill-founded, 
considering that the availability of abortion abroad was a sufficient safeguard of the applicant’s 
right to life. Thus, the Court failed to appreciate the intrinsically inequitable nature of a 
legislative framework that discriminates against women (like A and B) who do not have the 
financial means for abortion travel. The Court also rejected the applicants’ complaints under 
Article 3. They argued that the law was discriminatory and stigmatising of women, causing 
physical, psychological and financial burdens;36 thus, it amounted to inhuman or degrading 
treatment.  By contrast, the Court failed to grasp the importance of their internal perspective 
and experience of the law: it merely reaffirmed the minimum level of severity required in 
Article 3 claims. According to its case law, the assessment of the “minimum” depended on 
factors like duration, mental effects and, “in some cases”, sex, age and health of the victim. It 
did not rest on the social or economic grounds that were central to the first two applicants’ 
claims. Hence, none of the Article 3 claims were upheld. Accordingly, their associated claims 
under Article 14 were also dismissed as “manifestly ill-founded”.37 
 
In relation to their Article 8 claims, the applicants first pointed out that Ireland’s means of 
protecting the unborn affected women’s lives disproportionately.38 Further the entirety of 
abortion law created financial burdens that impacted more on poor women,39 thereby 
discriminating against them on the grounds of class. In response to these arguments, the Court 
adhered to the framework of formal privacy rights and, therefore, misconstrued the issue at 
stake. Although it recognised the notion of private life as encompassing personal autonomy, it 
nevertheless found it necessary to add the caveat that pregnancy to some extent annihilates 
women’s selfhood:40 women’s rights are weighed against the right to life of the foetus (where 
35 ECHR, Art. 8(2) which states that “There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. 
36 [2010] ECHR 2032, paras.162-163. 
37 Ibid., para.165. 
38 Ibid., paras.170-172. 
39 Ibid., para.173. 
40 Ibid., paras.212-213. 
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domestic law recognises it). In other words, the Court refrained from challenging the assertion 
that a foetus is a rights-bearing individual. Rather than engaging with the question of the 
substantive right to life of the foetus, the Court relied on the uncertain wording of Article 2, 
which allows “everyone” to enjoy the right to life. Ultimately, the reproductive rights of the 
claimants were articulated exclusively upon their “private” sexuality and personal autonomy, 
rather than the repercussions that denying them abortions would have with respect to their 
economic and social status. 
 
Although the Court identified that there had been an interference with the applicants’ private 
lives, the question turned to whether that interference was justified by a legitimate aim under 
Article 8(2). The Court’s assessment relied on the legitimacy of the state’s protection of the 
life of the unborn as an aspect of the protection of morals. Since Ireland had implemented 
legislation, through the use of referendums, to protect the life of the unborn, the Court felt that 
it could not challenge the legitimacy of the state’s abortion regime. In particular, the alleged 
moral beliefs of the Irish people were used against the applicants’ claims. Thus, the Court did 
not examine the gender-specific impacts of such protection. At the same time, it avoided any 
substantive evaluation of Ireland’s abortion law by observing that, since the ethical issues 
raised by abortion are of a sensitive nature, states should enjoy a wide margin of appreciation.41 
While it found a violation of Article 8 with regard to the third applicant, it struck down the 
claims by the first and second applicants. 
 
The Court’s reasoning concerning Ireland’s margin of legislative discretion contradicted past 
case law where the discretion of Member States had been curtailed by the development of 
consensus on a certain issue at regional level.42 The wide discretion accorded to Ireland 
relegated the Court to a role that merely considered whether the state had acted within its own 
conception of human rights. Since the first and second applicants’ complaints sought to affirm 
the substantive right to abortion, the Court could not go as far as to find a violation. On the 
other hand, it was more demanding about Ireland’s obligations toward the third applicant. It 
41 Ibid., paras.227-228, 233-238. For a critical evaluation of the ‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine and the conflict 
between universality and relativity in ECHR jurisprudence see C. Cosentino, ‘Safe and Legal Abortion: An 
Emerging Human Right? The Long-lasting Dispute with State Sovereignty in ECHR Jurisprudence’ (2015) Human 
Rights Law Review 15(3), p.569, 573. 
42 Most notably, see the case of Goodwin v United Kingdom (ECHR 28957/95, 11 July 2002), where the UK 
legislation was held to violate the human rights of transsexuals and had to be changed in order to enable legal 
recognition of their post-operative sex.  
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held that the authorities had failed to comply with their positive obligation to secure respect for 
her private life: the failure to implement a “regime providing an accessible and effective 
procedure by which [she] could have established whether she qualified for a lawful abortion 
amounted to a breach of Article 8”.43  
 
The Court’s upholding of Ireland’s restrictive law demonstrated that women’s reproductive 
rights are ultimately in the hands of the state; they do not enjoy protection independently of the 
domestic laws governing them. This non-interventionist approach precluded the substantive 
protection of the applicants’ rights as human rights under the ECHR. 
 
P and S v Poland 
 
Poland banned abortion in 1993. The Act on Family Planning, Human Embryo Protection and 
Conditions for Lawful Pregnancy Termination (hereafter, the ‘Anti-Abortion Act’) resulted 
from intensive anti-abortion campaigns led by the Roman Catholic Church and was supported 
by both political forces and medical professionals.  The restrictive regime of the Anti-Abortion 
Act permits abortion in three circumstances, namely when the woman’s life is at risk, the foetus 
is irremediably impaired or there is suspicion that the pregnancy resulted from rape.  
 
In P and S v Poland, 44 the first applicant was a 14-year-old who had become pregnant as a 
result of rape. She decided to seek abortion with the help of her mother, the second applicant. 
The search for a facility that would provide the treatment began when the District Prosecutor 
issued a permit acknowledging the rape that led to her pregnancy. However, despite P’s legal 
entitlement to an abortion, she was repeatedly refused referral. First, her mother visited the 
Hospital of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration in Lublin for a referral; there, 
she was advised to contact a consultant for gynaecology and obstetrics. Later on, the consultant 
directed her to a public hospital where a chief physician attempted to set up a meeting between 
the applicants and a Catholic priest. P was manipulated into signing a statement confirming her 
willingness to carry her pregnancy to term. The hospital issued a press release of P’s story and 
she became the focus of national media attention. During her stay at the hospital, P was the 
target of a harassment campaign by several anti-abortion activists who contacted her privately. 
43 [2010] ECHR 2032, para.267. 
44 [2012] ECHR 1853. 
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Upon her release from hospital, P was placed in a juvenile shelter whilst her mother was 
accused of forcing her to get an abortion. P was locked in a room without access to facilities; 
for days she was separated from her family. Ultimately, she was able to deny the allegation 
against her mother. She testified to the falsity of the allegation at a court hearing that lasted 
three hours. After two weeks, P was released from the shelter and returned home. She obtained 
an abortion at a hospital 500 kilometres from where she resided. 
 
The applicants complained that Poland had breached Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. The 
Court admitted submissions from various third parties. The Polish Helsinki Foundation for 
Human Rights stressed that while the 1993 Act on Family Planning grants women de jure 
abortion access, it is difficult (if not virtually impossible) for Polish women to assert such right 
de facto.45 Furthermore, the clause on conscientious objection is more than often invoked on 
behalf of entire health care facilities.46 Similarly, Amnesty International observed that “[the 
subjection] of a child to sustained and aggravated harassment with a view to getting her to 
continue an unwanted pregnancy […] constitutes mental violence”.47 
 
The Court’s approach was consistent with its procedural abortion rights jurisprudence.48 It 
focused on Poland’s failure to address the systemic and deliberate violations by health care 
providers of the applicant’s right to private life; however, it failed to appreciate that those 
violations derived from a broader landscape of gender relations in Poland, where women’s 
social status is defined by the religious and moral considerations of political forces. The Court 
was only able to find a violation of Article 8 insofar as P’s right to abortion was permitted by 
the 1993 Act: had the case been unaltered, but with no statutory provisions to support P’s access 
to abortion, the Court would have rejected the Article 8 complaint (as in A, B and C v Ireland).49 
As Erdman explains, the value of procedural human rights protection depends on the state’s 
45 Ibid., para.58. 
46 Ibid., para.59. 
47 Ibid., para.77. However, Amnesty’s emphasis that the first applicant was a child should be distinguished from 
feminist contentions on women’s reproductive freedom. It is not the vulnerability of the woman that matters 
(i.e. her status as a “child”), but rather it is her informed choice that should be upheld independently of age. If 
we replace the word “child” with “woman”, Amnesty’s argument strengthens. 
48 See, e.g., A, B and C v Ireland [2010] ECHR 2032; Tysiąc v. Poland [2007] ECHR 219; R.R. v Poland [2011] ECHR 
828. 
49 See A, B and C v Ireland, ibid., para.242, where the Court concluded that there had been no violation of Article 
8 as regarded the first and second applicants, as opposed to the third applicant (para.267). 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
14 
 
                                                          
feminists@law  Vol 6, No 2 (2017) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
failure to implement procedural safeguards to secure the rights pre-established through its 
domestic law.50 
 
In assessing the Article 3 claim, the Court reiterated the threshold of “minimum severity”. It 
took the view that the treatment of P was inhuman because it had been premeditated and had 
actuated bodily harm; moreover, it was degrading in that it aroused “fear, anguish and 
inferiority capable of […] debasing [her]”.51 I take issue with the fact that the Court did not 
take the same approach in recognising the inhuman and degrading treatment of the applicants 
in A, B and C v Ireland based on their personal experiences. It appears that the Court’s decision 
in the present case was unduly influenced by the age of the applicant. The Court depicted her 
as a “vulnerable and distraught teenager in a difficult life situation”.52 Ultimately, I believe that 
P’s Article 3 complaint succeeded by virtue of her status as a victim and a child. The Court did 
not articulate its reasoning around P’s agency and right to self-determination; thus, it failed to 
address the substance of her right to lawful abortion. 
 
 
Feminist rewritings of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence 
 
The following rewritings show the importance of adopting feminist standards when 
adjudicating on abortion cases. Their aim is to restore the applicants to the centre of their own 
narratives and demonstrate awareness of those factors which underpinned their requests for 
abortions. In my rewritings, I consider factors such as personal autonomy and intersectional 
discrimination when assessing the legitimacy of states’ restrictions. Similarly, the feminist 
judgments challenge the masculinist assumptions on proportionality, privacy, discrimination 
and inhuman treatment and put forward alternative feminist interpretations of these concepts.  
 
As outlined above, the method adopted is inspired by Eva Brems’ edited collection, Diversity 
and European Human Rights: Rewriting Judgments of the ECHR. 53 It consists in redrafting 
parts of the original judgments that constituted the Court’s reasoning and decision-making 
50 Joanna N. Erdman, ‘Procedural Abortion Rights: Ireland and the European Court of Human Rights’ (2014) 
Reproductive Health Matters 22(44), pp.28-29. 
51 [2012] ECHR 1853, para.158. 
52 Ibid., para.131. 
53 Brems, op. cit. n.5. 
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processes. The redrafted paragraphs are distinguished from the originals by the use of bold 
fonts. In so far as possible, they follow the paragraph numbering of the original judgments.54 
Deleted paragraphs/fragments are indicated by elipses.  
 
 
A, B and C v Ireland 
 
C. Article 2 of the Convention 
 
157. The third applicant complained under Article 2 that abortion was not available in Ireland 
even in a life-threatening situation because of the failure to implement Article 40.3.3 of the 
Constitution. The Government argued that no issue arose under Article 2 of the Convention. 
158. The Court has acknowledged in its case law that Article 2 imposes a positive 
obligation on the State to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction. The 
obligation includes taking all necessary measures “to prevent the applicant’s life being 
unavoidably put at risk” (LCB v United Kingdom (1998), § 36, Reports and Judgments of 
Decisions 1998-III; Osman v United Kingdom (1998), § 116, Reports 1998-VIII). In 
particular, the denial of health care may raise issues when it threatens the individual’s 
right to life. 
Although there is no regional consensus on the point at which life begins, i.e. for the 
foetus, the Court observes that the right to life of the applicant is protected under 
international treaties, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on 
54 I recommend that, in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the aim of this project, the feminist 
redraftings should be read alongside the original judgments. It suffices that the reader refers back to the original 
judgments (e.g. for the paragraphs written in bold) and notes the different approaches adopted in the feminist 
versions. 
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Human Rights. Thus, the Court takes into account the consensus under these human 
rights instruments as a basis for its findings. 
The third applicant was entitled to the protection granted by Article 2 where the 
pregnancy constituted a real and serious threat to her life by reason of her pre-existing 
condition.  In Attorney General v. X (1992) I.E.S.C. 1; (1992) 1 I.R. 1, the Supreme Court 
of Ireland found that the risk to an applicant’s life, in that case self-destruction, as a result 
of continuing the pregnancy was sufficient to derogate from domestic legislation and 
allow a termination. Similarly, the Court hereby finds that the possibility of serious 
deterioration in the third applicant’s health was a sufficient ground for the 
implementation of Article 40.3.3. 
159. The Court rejects the State’s contention that the fact that C, in light of the 
Thirteenth Amendment of the Irish Constitution, was able to travel to England for 
abortion defeated her claim. Rather, it accepts that the continuation of a pregnancy would 
have posed a real and serious risk to C’s life and that the State, by failing to take all 
necessary measures to secure her domestic right to abortion, contributed to that risk. 
160. The Court concludes that, due to evidence as to the likely consequences that 
continuing a pregnancy would have had on C’s health, the State failed to fulfil its positive 
obligations under Article 2.  
 
D. Article 3 of the Convention 
 
161. The Court considers it evident […] that the applicants suffered serious psychological 
and physical hardship whilst travelling abroad for abortion. It was also financially 
burdensome for the first applicant (see paragraph 128). 
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162. […] The Court reiterates its case-law to the effect that ill-treatment must attain a 
minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this 
minimum depends on evidence of the effects that the circumstances of the case had on the 
applicants, including the extent and duration of the treatment, its physical and mental 
repercussions and the socio-cultural background, sex, age, health and financial status of 
the victim […]. In the above-described factual circumstances […] and whether or not such 
treatment is entirely attributable to the State, the Court considers that the facts alleged may 
disclose a level of severity falling within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention. 
 163. The physical pain associated with the criminalisation of abortion in Ireland is 
evident from the facts of the case. The first applicant was reluctant to seek medical 
assistance for fear of the legal implications of having an abortion abroad. Whilst her 
unawareness of the law is not entirely attributable to the State, third-party submissions 
(see paragraphs 120-121) demonstrate a lack of procedural efficiency in abortion services 
in Ireland and a general reluctance to assist women in obtaining abortions and post-
abortion care.  
164. The second applicant experienced a similar concern when she required medical 
assistance after passing blood clots. The third applicant suffered complications as a result 
of an incomplete abortion and was not directed by her GP to seek post-abortion care when 
it became apparent she was no longer pregnant. In terms of psychological impact on the 
applicants, the Court accepts that this is by its nature subjective (see paragraph 126) and 
cannot be measured objectively. However, the Court has previously determined that 
sexual assaults reach the minimum level of severity required to meet the Article 3 
threshold (see, for example, Aydin v Turkey (1998) 25 H.E.R. 251; E v UK (2003) 36 
E.H.H.R. 31; Maslova v Russia (2009) 48 E.H.H.R. 37). In those cases, to force an 
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involuntarily pregnant woman to carry her pregnancy to term would breach the positive 
obligations of the State under Article 3.  
165. The Court is of the view that, regardless of the woman’s status as victim of a crime, 
or the risk to her life and health, it is necessary to acknowledge the impact of an unwanted 
pregnancy. The forced continuation of an unwanted pregnancy or the clandestine 
termination of pregnancy are both capable of causing the deterioration of a woman’s 
physical and mental status. Similarly, the conditions under which the first and second 
applicants travelled abroad were imposed by Ireland’s restrictions and contributed to the 
applicants’ mental and physical suffering.  
 166. The Court considers that the mental and physical effects of the restrictions on the 
first and second applicants’ access to abortion were sufficient to declare the treatment 
degrading under Article 3. The third applicant’s health status was particularly severe 
prior to her seeking abortion, and the State’s failure to safeguard her health may be 
considered inhuman within the meaning of Article 3.  
The Court has not provided in its case law a general standard against which to measure 
any given treatment. Rather, it acknowledges that considerations regarding ill-treatment 
change over time. The Court considers that the cost and subsequent stigma associated 
with travelling abroad for abortion can be interpreted, cumulatively with the 
abovementioned physical and mental effects, as reaching the minimum level of severity 
required under Article 3. 
167. The Court concludes, having regard to the circumstances of the case seen as a 
whole, that the Irish prohibition had serious effects on the lives of the applicants and that 
their suffering reached the minimum level of severity under Article 3. 
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II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION 
 
168. The first and second applicants complained under Article 8 about the restrictions on 
lawful abortion in Ireland which meant that they could not obtain an abortion for health and/or 
well-being reasons in Ireland, and the third applicant complained under the same Article about 
the absence of any legislative implementation of Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution. 
[…]  
 
(a) Positive or negative obligations under Article 8 of the Convention? 
 
216. Since there are positive obligations inherent in effective respect for private life (see 
paragraphs 244-246 below), the Court considers it appropriate to analyse the first and second 
applicants’ complaints as concerning Ireland’s positive obligations […].  
217. The Court has reaffirmed in its case law the right of citizens to effective respect of 
their physical and psychological integrity (Maric v Croatia (dec.) no. 50132/12, 12 June 
2014; VK v Slovakia (dec.) no. 18968/07, 8 November 2011; Glass v United Kingdom, no. 
61827/00, 9 March 2004). It observes that the respect of psychological and physical 
integrity may entail the adoption of measures by the State, including the provision of 
health care services such as abortion.  
218. […] The essential question […] is whether the State’s prohibition is an unjustified 
interference with the applicants’ rights under Article 8[…]. 
219. […] The Court must examine whether or not the interference was justified under the 
second paragraph of Article 8 namely, whether it was “in accordance with the law” and 
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“necessary in a democratic society” for the pursuit of one of the legitimate aims specified in 
Article 8 of the Convention. 
 
(b) Was the interference “in accordance with the law”? 
 
220. The applicants accepted that the restriction was in accordance with the law […].  
221. […] The Court also considers that it was clearly foreseeable that the first and second 
applicants were not entitled to an abortion in Ireland for health and/or well-being reasons 
within the legislative framework of sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person 
Act 1861, as qualified by Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court in Attorney General v. X (see paragraph 158). However, the Court acknowledges 
that the applicants’ claims relate to their substantive right to abortion under Article 8 as 
opposed to the existing procedural framework of Irish abortion law. The Court accepts 
that the Irish framework provided no procedural right to domestic abortion for the 
applicants but identifies a substantive right to physical autonomy (e.g. abortion) under 
Article 8 of the ECHR.  
 
(c) Did the interference pursue a legitimate aim? 
 
222. The Court points out that, in the above-cited Open Door case (paragraph 38), it found 
that the protection afforded under Irish law to the right to life of the foetus was based on 
profound moral values […] which were reflected in the stance of the majority of the Irish people 
[…]. 
 […] 
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227. The Court concludes that the impugned restriction therefore pursued the legitimate aim 
of the protection of morals of which the protection in Ireland of the right to life of the unborn 
was one aspect. 
[…].  
 
(d) Was the interference “necessary in a democratic society”? 
 
[…] 
230. The Court must examine whether there existed a pressing social need for the measure 
in question and, in particular, whether the interference was proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued (see paras. 222-227 above) […]. The Court observes that the first and second 
applicants faced substantial hardship in having to travel abroad for an abortion and, on 
this basis, proceeds to evaluate the proportionality of the State’s interference. 
231. The Court acknowledges that the impugned prohibition is based on the legal 
framework implemented under the Irish Constitution, which does not permit abortion 
for health and well-being reasons. In examining the necessity of the interference, the 
Court must consider whether there were no lesser means available to the state to achieve 
the legitimate aim of protecting the right to life of the foetus as part of protecting morals. 
While a margin of appreciation could be accorded to the State, the Court observes that 
the right to life of the unborn could not be accorded primacy to the exclusion of the 
proportionate protection of the rights of women [...]. 
232. The Court points out that a number of factors must be considered when determining 
the State’s margin of appreciation. These include the applicants’ right to personal 
autonomy and physical and psychological integrity as affirmed in the Court’s case law. 
Further, in conjunction with the protection from discrimination under Article 14, the 
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Court emphasises Ireland’s duty to make access to abortion under its framework 
available to all women equally. In this case, the financial hardship imposed on poorer 
women as a result of the requirement to travel abroad for an abortion cannot be 
interpreted as necessary in a democratic society. 
233. The Court accepts that the State’s interference may be necessary for the fulfilment 
of the specific needs of the Irish society. However, it clarifies that the protection of morals 
is based on standards that are by their very nature subjective. In addition, the standards 
set out by the Council of Europe and its Member States are relevant in adjudicating on 
internationally recognised human rights such as Article 8. 
234. The question is whether Ireland’s wide margin of appreciation on abortion is 
narrowed by the existence of the international human rights standards set out in the 
European Convention on Human Rights. The Court relies on the existence of international 
treaties that guarantee the protection of women’s rights to personal autonomy and integrity, in 
particular the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women. 
[…] The existence of a consensus has long played a role in the development and evolution of 
Convention protections […], the Convention being considered a “living instrument” […]. 
Therefore, the increasing importance of human rights protection may be invoked to 
justify a progressive interpretation of Convention rights, particularly where individuals’ 
enjoyment of human rights in Member States is hindered by their socioeconomic status. 
[…] 
240. In the European Union, abortion access has increased over the past ten years. In 
Austria, Belgium, France, Great Britain, The Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, abortion 
access is available upon request within set timeframes. In France, medical or surgical 
abortions can be performed by doctors in a private practice. In Norway, abortion is 
available free of charge. In other Member States such as Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
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Italy, Portugal and Spain, abortion is permitted if the woman can demonstrate some form 
of distress – either physical, mental or socioeconomic – caused by the pregnancy. 
Abortion is illegal in a few Member States, including Poland and Malta, where women 
and physicians who receive or perform abortions can be jailed between 18 months and 3 
years. 
241. The Court appreciates the varying degrees of permissibility of abortion in the 
European Union. However, in light of the majority of Member States’ trend towards 
permitting abortion, Irish women are likely to seek abortion abroad under the Thirteenth 
Amendment of the Irish Constitution. This means that the legitimate aim claimed by 
Ireland (i.e. the protection of morals; see paragraph 222 above) is frustrated by the 
State’s own legal framework giving women alternative, albeit burdensome, means of 
obtaining abortion. Under this framework, the applicants’ health and well-being was 
disproportionately affected by the necessity to travel abroad, which has financial 
implications: it was foreseeable that Ireland’s prohibition would have more severe effects 
on women in complicated life circumstances. 
242. The Court is not therefore persuaded that the interference was necessary to 
protect the right to life of the foetus as part of the protection of morals. It observes that 
there may be alternative methods of achieving these aims that do not cause such hardship 
to abortion-seeking women. The wide margin accorded to the State nevertheless requires 
it to consider the effects that such interference would have on women.  
243. The prohibition in Ireland of abortion for health and well-being reasons exceeds 
the margin of appreciation accorded in that respect to the Irish State. In such circumstances, 
the Court finds that it did not strike a fair balance between the right of the first and second 
applicants to respect for their private lives and the rights invoked on behalf of the unborn as 
part of the protection of morals. The Court reiterates that there is no confirmed evidence 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
24 
 
feminists@law  Vol 6, No 2 (2017) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
that the interference can achieve the legitimate aim claimed by the State, due to the 
availability of abortion in other Member States. Ultimately, the protection of morals 
affects disadvantaged women who cannot afford to travel abroad more than it does 
wealthier Irish women who can readily seek abortion elsewhere. 
 
(e) The Court’s conclusion as regards the first and second applicants 
 
244. The Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the 
Convention. 
[…] 
 
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION TAKEN IN 
CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 8 
 
269. The applicants also complained that the above described restrictions and limitations on 
lawful abortion in Ireland were discriminatory and in breach of Article 14 of the Convention 
taken in conjunction with Article 8 in that they placed an excessive burden on them as women 
and, in particular, on the first applicant as an impoverished woman. 
 
The Court’s assessment 
270. The Court considers it necessary to examine the applicants’ complaints under 
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8.  
Previous case law indicates the principles to be observed when determining a breach 
of Article 14 in relation to one of the Convention rights. The differential treatment of 
individuals “in relevantly similar situations” can amount to discrimination if it is not 
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objectively and reasonably justified. The same applies to States’ failures “to treat 
differently persons whose situations are significantly different” without appropriate 
justification (Thlimmenos v Greece (2001) 31 E.H.H.R. 411 § 44). The Court appreciates 
that abortion per se is a gender-specific issue that is likely to result in discrimination when 
denied; the Court has previously accepted that “a general policy […] that has 
disproportionately prejudicial effects on a particular group may be considered 
discriminatory notwithstanding [emphasis added] that it is not specifically aimed at that 
group” (DH v Czech Republic (2008) 47 E.H.H.R. 59).  
271. The Court acknowledges that Ireland’s impugned legal framework was aimed at 
a specific group of persons, namely abortion-seeking women. The Court therefore 
considers it discriminatory against women on the ground of sex. The framework also had 
disproportionally prejudicial effects on the applicants, as discussed in relation to their 
complaints under Article 8 (see paragraphs 216-241). Therefore, the Court rejects the 
Government’s argument that such differential and discriminatory treatment was 
justifiable and proportionate for the reasons referred to under Article 8 of the 
Convention. In light of the Council of Europe’s goal of achieving gender equality, it is not 
possible for Member States to set independent thresholds for gender bias and 
discrimination.  
272. In addition, the Court considers Ireland’s legal framework to be discriminatory 
against women on grounds of class. As mentioned in response to the applicants’ Article 8 
claims, it is evident that the Irish framework on abortion is more burdensome for 
disadvantaged or impoverished women. Some women may not avail themselves of the 
rights under the Thirteenth Amendment to travel abroad, for financial reasons; others, 
upon their return, may be unable obtain post-abortion treatment as submitted by third 
parties to this application and in the case of the third applicant (see paragraph 163). 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
26 
 
feminists@law  Vol 6, No 2 (2017) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
273. States must demonstrate that the discriminatory measures were advanced to 
pursue a legitimate aim. In order to dismiss a complaint under Article 14, the Court must 
be satisfied that there is a relationship of proportionality between the aim pursued and 
the measures applied. The Court has previously stated that the impugned prohibition on 
abortion does not strike a fair balance between the State’s aim of preserving unborn life 
as part of protecting morals and the rights of the applicants (see above, paragraphs 216-
242). Similarly, the success of the Article 14 complaints depends on whether 
discrimination against abortion-seeking women was a proportionate means of achieving 
such aim. 
274. The court observes that the prohibition of abortion on health and well-being 
grounds denies women, not men, their capacity for responsible decision-making as moral 
agents because it substitutes their decisions with others’ moral values. Whilst the latter 
are legitimate, the Court does not accept that they must take precedence over women’s 
decisions that affect their identity and bodily integrity.  
Further, the Court considers that the prohibition constitutes an affront to women’s 
dignity as autonomous human beings. Since the prohibition only affects women, it results 
in inequality between men and women in society, in that men enjoy a greater control over 
their reproductive lives. The evidence submitted by the applicants demonstrates that 
women’s limited control over reproduction has a substantial impact on the quality of their 
lives by increasing their physical, psychological and financial vulnerability.  
The Court concludes that there has been a breach of Article 14 in combination with 
Article 8, in that the discrimination against abortion-seeking women is not a 
proportionate means of protecting the life of the foetus or the morals of the Irish people. 
The State’s legal framework had disproportionate effect on the applicants’ lives and, 
therefore, cannot be justifiable under Article 14. 
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P and S v Poland 
 
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION AS REGARDS 
THE DETERMINATION OF ACCESS TO LAWFUL ABORTION 
 
[…] 
 
The Court’s assessment 
(a) General principles 
94. The essential object of Article 8 is to protect the individual against arbitrary and 
unjustified interference by public authorities. […] In certain circumstances there may be 
positive obligations inherent in the respect for private life. […]. The Court has previously 
found States to be under a positive obligation to secure to their citizens the right to effective 
respect for their physical and psychological integrity […], including the provision of an 
effective and accessible means of protecting the right to respect for private life (see Tysiąc v. 
Poland, §110; R.R. v. Poland, §184) […]. 
95. The Court has previously held in its case law that Article 8 does not guarantee the 
right to an abortion in itself. However, it considers that the implications of a continued 
pregnancy are capable of affecting the private lives of women. In addition, the prohibition 
of abortion on health or well-being grounds directly conflicts with the right to respect for 
one’s private life as proclaimed in Article 8 (see A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], no. 25579/05, 
§ 245, 16 December 2010, § 214).   
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
28 
 
feminists@law  Vol 6, No 2 (2017) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
96. The Court understands that the ethical debate over the status of the foetus cannot 
be resolved and that it is not desirable for the Court to give a final decision on the point 
at which life begins. However, the Court finds that there is a consensus amongst a 
substantial majority of the Contracting States of the Council of Europe that allowing 
abortion is crucial to the advancement of women’s reproductive freedom. Since it is not 
possible to establish a definitive stance on the life of the foetus, the Court considers that 
it is more desirable to strike a fair balance between the individual’s private life and the 
public interest, excluding speculative assertions on the interest of the unborn. 
97. The Court considers that the religious, moral and ethical views of the Polish people 
– which may also be held by public authorities – may pose an obstacle to the practical and 
effective enjoyment of the rights which the Convention intends to guarantee. In the 
present case, these views constituted a significant impediment to the implementation of 
the laws regulating abortion; nevertheless, the State is, on all occasions, under a positive 
obligation to create a procedural framework enabling a pregnant woman to exercise her 
right of access to lawful abortion (A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], cited above, § 249; R.R. v. 
Poland, cited above, § 200). […] Whilst Article 8 does not prescribe a specific procedure 
for the fulfilment of a state’s positive obligations, it is fundamental to determine whether 
the interests and views of the individual concerned have been taken into account. The 
Court has […] held that in the context of access to abortion the relevant procedure should 
guarantee to a pregnant woman at least [emphasis added] the possibility to be heard in person 
and to have her views considered. This is necessary because medical professionals who hold 
opposing views also hold a disproportionate amount of power to determine the timing 
and success of the termination compared to the interested woman. A competent body or 
person should provide cogent grounds for its decision and take the appropriate measures 
for the woman’s choice to be otherwise observed. 
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[…] 
112. Having regard to the circumstances of the case and the regional standards developed 
on the issue of abortion access, the Court concludes that the authorities failed to comply with 
their positive obligation to secure the applicants’ effective respect for their private life. There 
has therefore been a breach of Article 8 of the Convention. 
[…] 
 
V. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION 
 
150. The applicants further complained that the facts of the case had given rise to a breach 
of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the first applicant.  
[…] 
 
B. The Court’s assessment 
 
157. The Court has established that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of 
severity to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum level of severity 
is relative; it depends on the evidence of the effect that the circumstances of the case had 
on the individual in question,55 including the extent and duration of the treatment, its 
physical and psychological repercussions, the socio-cultural background, sex, age, health 
and financial status of the victim. 
[…] 
55 See the redraft of A, B and C v Ireland, above, para.164. 
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161. The Court takes into account that the first applicant was at the material time only 
fourteen years old. She was also a victim of rape. However, had the first applicant not been 
a minor or a victim of rape, the Court would maintain that the circumstances amounted 
to inhuman and degrading treatment. It considers that the systemic denial of abortion led 
to a prolonged and humiliating experience whereby P was unable to vindicate her 
statutory right to abortion. The public authorities disregarded her demand for lawful 
abortion and exposed her to the unsolicited opinions of religious figures and anti-abortion 
campaigners when it was clear that she wanted to terminate the pregnancy. 
162. In light of the above, the Court has no choice but to conclude that the first applicant 
was in a situation of great vulnerability. The Court also observes that the public authorities 
contributed to aggravate that situation.  
[…] 
166. On the whole, the Court considers that no proper regard was had to the first applicant’s 
vulnerability and young age; most importantly, her views and feelings were set aside and 
both applicants were put under considerable pressure by the Lublin hospital’s medical 
staff and the police. 
[…] 
168. The Court concludes, having regard to the circumstances of the case seen as a whole, 
that the first applicant was treated by the authorities in a deplorable manner and that her 
suffering reached the minimum threshold of severity under Article 3 of the Convention.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Feminist legal theory has critiqued the role of law in limiting women’s autonomy and 
reproductive freedom. Feminist scholars, particularly those involved in rewriting judgments, 
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have exposed the gender bias that is inherent in the law by demonstrating how the latter adopts 
masculine qualities, experiences and narratives as the legal norm. Consequently, the so-called 
universality of rights as interpreted in adjudication is best understood as a neutralisation of 
gender – that nevertheless exists in the social sphere – in the law.  
 
Feminist judgment-writing contends that the implications of legal rules for women’s lives are 
determined by an ideological framework that is entrenched into legal reasoning and decision-
making. However, feminist analyses of that framework can challenge the standpoints of actors 
in the legal process, both by raising awareness of the impact of the law on women’s social 
reality and by proposing alternative methods of reasoning that are less limiting to women’s 
freedom. In this sense, the method of feminist judging provides an innovative tool of struggle 
against the masculine norms imposed on women through the legal process. Feminist judgments 
contribute to our understanding of law’s potential to deliver gender justice so far as they enable 
feminist concerns to be heard and acted upon. Rewriting judgments from a feminist perspective 
allows for a comprehensive account of legal, social, political and other discourses that are 
active in society and influence individuals’ lives; it exemplifies the benefits that feminist 
reasoning can bring to the law as a living instrument; and it liberates the law from the normative 
construction of gender by addressing both theoretical and practical feminist concerns regarding 
women’s rights and liberties. 
 
As a result, law remains open to feminist critique and this article shows that feminist reasoning 
is not incompatible with legal reasoning. Similarly, law does not inherently disqualify women’s 
voices or their experiences of social reality. By interpreting legal rules from a feminist 
perspective, feminist judges actually implement the concept of substantive equality, which can 
only be attained if women are able to negotiate the content of their rights according to their 
own needs. The impact of feminist legal theory in academia combined with the future influence 
of feminist judgments in legal practice demonstrate that law can be interpreted progressively 
to develop and expand women’s rights and break historical stasis. 
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